Aviation Safety

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The Air Traffic Controllers Strike of 1981

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On Monday, August 3, 1981, more than 12,000 air traffic controllers (ATCs) went on strike against the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The strikers represented nearly 70 percent of all ATCs in the United States. As a result of the strike, 7,000 flights were cancelled.

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The FAA controls all air traffic control functions and personnel in the United States, from air traffic control to the personnel who control the national airspace.

 

The ATCs were members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO), which had been established in 1968 to protect the interests of the ATCs. At a time when other labor unions were striking for higher wages and better benefits, members of PATCO joined in and petitioned for a $10,000 wage hike, a 32-hour work week, and a better retirement package. When the FAA turned them down, citing Title 5 of the United States Code, Section 7311 (1956), the ATCs went on strike. The Labor Relations Act prohibits Federal unionized employees from using their union memberships for any purpose other than collective bargaining; that is, the process of negotiation between employees and employers to change salaries, benefits, and working conditions.

 

Then-President Ronald Reagan took matters in hand and informed the strikers that all who did not return to work within 48 hours would be fired and banned from being rehired to their positions. Even so, only a few hundred strikers returned to work, and on Wednesday, August 5, 1981, the President began proceedings to fire 11,359 ATCs.

 

Vacancies were partially filled by ATC supervisors, non-striking ATCs, and military ATCs. Miraculously, they managed to handle 80 percent of the air traffic control workload. Even so, the strike and resulting firings slowed air transportation in the United States for a number of months.

 

President Reagan was criticized for how he handled the situation. One might wonder why he acted as he did. We can only look at another aviation safety issue and wonder if that might not have been on his mind when he made his decision to put aviation safety above the ATCs' personal interests.

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On June 30, 1956, a United Airlines DC-7 traveling between Los Angeles and Chicago and a Trans World Airlines Lockheed Constellation traveling between Los Angeles and Kansas City collided over the Grand Canyon with a complete loss of life. In those days, air traffic control technology was much less well developed than it is today. The ATCs, who were located only at airports, did not have communication with air crews after their aircraft left the airport vicinity.

 

Air Route Traffic Control Centers, which today control air traffic between airports, did not yet exist. Instead, the aircraft were tracked by radio beacons located at waypoints. On the flight in question, the waypoints nearest to the Grand Canyon were in Needles, California, and Durango, Colorado. The space in between was uncontrolled. The only way a flight crew could communicate either with the ATCs or another aircraft was by calling their company and having it contact the ATCs or other aircraft.

 

On the day in question, weather was stormy in the vicinity of the Grand Canyon. The pilot of the DC-7 radioed United Airlines operations to request permission to increase altitude to 21,000 feet in order to fly above the weather. United relayed the request to ATC, which denied the request. The ATC made its decision based on the brief period of time before the aircraft would reach the next waypoint.

 

Because the aircraft were in uncontrolled airspace, the pilot of each plane was responsible for keeping a lookout for other planes and making his own decisions about whether to fly above the weather. In the stormy weather, the flight crews failed to see each other, and a collision occurred. It was the first aviation incident in which more than 100 fatalities occurred, making it critically important in determining the future of aviation safety.

 

Accordingly, it seems almost certain that President Reagan had this crash in mind when he demanded that the ATCs return to their posts and ensure aviation safety and make their personal interests secondary concerns. If he underestimated the situation, it was in what must have been his impression of how few ATCs would return to their positions.

 

Twenty years after the air traffic controllers strike of 1981, the importance of dedicated ATCs was brought once more to the forefront with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. In this instance, the ATCs had to take limited information about what was happening in order to direct more than 4,500 aircraft to safe landings around the country, as well as to close the National Airspace System until it could be determined that it was safe to fly again. Aviation safety was beautifully executed, and countless lives were saved.

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We will not forget the passengers aboard United Airlines Flight 93, who made the selfless decision to send the aircraft into a Pennsylvania farm, rather than allow the hijackers to fly it into their intended target. Some sources say that target was the White House, while others say it was the Capitol Building. Either would have been disastrous beyond words.

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In every case, aviation safety has been seen to be of paramount importance. When a passenger steps aboard an aircraft, he or she places great faith in the aircraft, the flight crew, and the ATCs to give them a safe flight. Sometimes, it is difficult to know just how far we should go to ensure aviation safety. Did President Reagan make a mistake? If so, he and aviation authorities quickly picked up the slack and provided backup air traffic control until new ATCs could be trained, certified, and employed.

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